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One look at the long list of abbreviations used for U.S. farm programs indicates 
the pervasive role that government 
plays in providing subsidized risk 
management to the U.S. crop sector. 
To take full advantage of these sub-
sidies, farmers and those who serve 
them need to be able to decipher 
not only what ACRE, GRP, SURE, 
GRIP, RA, CRC, APH, LDP, DP, CCP, 
and HRO stand for but also how the 
programs work and how they either 
substitute for or complement one 
another as well as other private risk 
management efforts. 
These programs guarantee crop 
prices; yields at the fi eld, farm, and 
county levels; and revenue at the 
fi eld, farm, county, and state levels 
(see the table below). The price guar-
antees can increase if farm prices 
rise after planting. Some guarantees 
are based on historic acreage; oth-
ers are based on the current year’s 
planted acreage. Some guarantees 
are based on past prices and yields; 
others are based on projected prices 
and yields. One program (DP) pays 
out every year, even if yields and 
prices are at all-time record levels. 
Another program (SURE) requires 
that farmers buy crop insurance. 
The programs are also com-
plex in their administration. Some 
of the guarantees are administered 
by USDA’s Farm Service Agency 
(FSA). Others are administered by 
the USDA’s Risk Management Agen-
cy (RMA). The RMA programs are 
delivered to farmers by private crop 
insurance agents who are paid com-
missions fully funded by taxpayers. 
FSA programs are delivered to farm-
ers by government employees fully 
funded by taxpayers. Payments from 
RMA programs come from a fund 
that farmers contribute to but that is 
mostly funded by taxpayers. A por-
tion of the risk from the fund is borne 
by private insurance companies, 
but most of the RMA program risk 
is borne by taxpayers. All of the FSA 
program risk is paid for by taxpayers.
Fundamental questions that 
never seem to be addressed by 
those who support taxpayer subsi-
dies for risk management are wheth-
er the public receives any benefi ts 
from these subsidies, and if it does, 
whether the benefi ts outweigh the 
costs. If there is no broad public 
purpose served by subsidizing farm-
ers’ risk management decisions, 
then we need to look at parochial 
regional benefi ts and the profi ts of 
private businesses to understand 
why the programs are proliferating 
at such a rapid rate. 
Agricultural Risk Management Programs and Options
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The Cost of Agricultural Risk
Farmers are not unlike other inves-
tors: they invest in annual operating 
inputs (land rent, seed, fertilizer, 
fuel, and chemicals), machinery, and 
land in the hope that they will earn 
enough from the sale of their crops 
to cover their operating costs and 
payments on their machinery and 
land. If they do, then they earn a 
profi t. If not, then they must call on 
their own assets to cover the loss or 
ask forbearance from their lenders.
Economists measure the cost of 
risk as the difference between the 
amount of money that an investor 
expects to make on average from a 
risky investment and the smallest 
amount of money that the same in-
vestor would accept to sell the risky 
investment. If the investment has 
low risk, then this difference will be 
small. Very risky investments lead to 
a high cost of risk because of a large 
probability that the investment will 
be lost. Most investors will not take 
on high-risk investments unless the 
payback when the investment is not 
lost is substantial. This gives rise to 
the risk/return trade-off. To induce 
investment in risky assets, the re-
turns when the investment pays out 
must be large enough to compensate 
investors for the high probability 
that the investment will be lost.
The cost of risk is a real produc-
tion cost. And because the cost of 
risk is greater for riskier crops and 
in riskier regions, farmers who grow 
these crops or who farm in these 
regions have higher costs of produc-
tion than farmers who do not. 
Private or Public Provision of 
Risk Management?
Farmers should treat risk just as 
they treat any other production 
input, such as fertilizer, seed, and 
machinery, by balancing the re-
turns from its use with the associ-
ated increased cost. For example, in 
years in which the returns to corn 
are expected to be higher than the 
returns to soybeans, farmers can in-
crease expected profi ts by planting 
more corn and less soybeans. But 
the increase in expected profi ts only 
comes about by taking on more risk, 
because growing more corn typical-
ly reduces diversifi cation. Farmers 
that have a high tolerance for risk 
(which means that risk imposes a 
low cost on them) will tend to plant 
more corn than will farmers with a 
lower tolerance of risk.
Farmers should also invest in 
activities that reduce the cost of risk 
by more than the cost of the activ-
ity. The value of the risk reduction 
from diversifi cation of family labor 
and management efforts into both 
on- and off-farm activities often is 
greater than the cost associated with 
that diversifi cation. Most farmers 
fi nd that the value of associated risk 
reduction is greater than the cost of 
hail, fi re, disability, health, and life in-
surance. Many farmers fi nd that the 
value of reducing price risk is greater 
than the cost of buying put options 
on commodity exchanges. And a few 
farmers fi nd that the value of hedg-
ing against poor weather during the 
growing season by buying put or call 
options on future weather is greater 
than the cost of the options. 
If farmers fully understand the 
risks they face and private markets 
exist to allow them to pay for desired 
levels of risk reductions, then the 
effi ciency with which agriculture op-
erates cannot be increased through 
subsidized risk management. The 
reason we have so many subsidized 
risk management programs is either 
that the private sector is incapable 
of providing the kind of tools that 
farmers desire or that Congress uses 
the subsidies to meet some other 
objective.
Private Price and Yield Insurance
On April 10, 2009, the 2009 new-crop 
corn futures price closed at $4.22 
per bushel. New-crop soybeans 
closed at $9.22 per bushel. Farmers 
can protect against drops in their 
harvest-time selling prices by selling 
a futures contract at these prices. 
There is no cost to selling a futures 
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contract, but farmers must deposit 
funds on each contract they sell and 
they must have access to suffi cient 
credit to make margin calls if prices 
rise. Put options are an alternative 
means of price protection whereby 
a farmer pays an amount up front 
(the option premium) for the right to 
sell a futures contract at a specifi ed 
price. The existence of commodity 
exchanges with highly liquid mar-
kets implies that the private sector 
is quite capable of providing price 
protection for farmers. 
Commodity exchanges work to 
provide price protection for farmers 
when there are suffi cient numbers of 
natural buyers who will take the op-
posite position of the natural selling 
interests of farmers. Agricultural pro-
cessors who are harmed when prices 
rise are those natural buyers in price 
contracts. Futures markets for state 
average yields failed because there 
were no interests that desired protec-
tion against high yields. This meant 
that no one was interested in buying 
farmers’ attempts to sell yield futures. 
However, in the Corn Belt, the condi-
tions that favor high corn and soy-
bean yields harm sellers of electricity 
used to run air conditioners in the 
summer. Cool summers tend to lead 
to low profi ts for generators and high 
yields. Hot summers lead to high de-
mand for electricity and large profi ts 
for power generators. Hot summers 
can also lead to low yields. Thus, a 
private market for weather contracts 
(which are actively traded on the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange) could be 
used by farmers as yield insurance. 
Crowding Out the Private Sector
So why don’t more farmers trade 
weather contracts to protect against 
the fi nancial losses caused by low 
yields? Because taxpayers fund a 
crop insurance program that offers 
insurance agents a large commis-
sion to get farmers to sign up for 
an insurance policy that pays out, 
on average, twice what a farmer is 
asked to pay as a premium. Private 
insurance companies are willing to 
insure a farmer’s yield because a 
large portion of the risk of this in-
surance is borne by taxpayers. Why 
should a farmer care about weather 
contracts when taxpayers provide 
more reliable coverage against low 
farm yields at a small fraction of the 
true cost of insurance?
Farmers who sign up for ACRE 
are protected against corn prices 
below $3.75/bu, soybean prices be-
low $8.75/bu, and wheat prices be-
low $6.00/bu. Farmers who buy sub-
sidized revenue insurance receive 
revenue guarantees based on $4.04 
for corn, $8.80 soybeans, and $6.20 
spring wheat. Farmers who sign up 
for both ACRE and crop insurance 
will receive double compensation 
if harvest prices fall dramatically. 
Why should farmers use the private 
sector and hedge against low prices 
when taxpayers are providing heav-
ily subsidized price protection?  
The private sector simply cannot 
compete with the heavily subsidized 
risk management programs offered 
by the government. The question 
then becomes whether taxpayers are 
getting anything in return for their 
investment or whether the subsidies 
are really just a hidden means of 
transferring money to farmers and 
the crop insurance industry.
Do Taxpayers Benefi t from Risk 
Management Subsidies? 
Left on their own to manage risk, 
farmers would choose to buy 
products and to use strategies that 
reduce the probability of fi nancial 
ruin to levels that refl ect the cost of 
the risk reduction. Given that many 
farmers in the United States and 
other countries survive and thrive 
without large risk management 
subsidies, it is apparent that farm-
ers’ actions combined with prod-
ucts provided by the private sec-
tor would be suffi cient to keep U.S. 
agriculture viable and producing 
abundant supplies of food for U.S. 
and world consumers. It is diffi cult 
to fi nd the extraordinary circum-
stances that make the production 
and marketing of corn, soybeans, 
wheat, rice, and cotton so different 
from that of other crops around the 
world that U.S. producers require 
heavily subsidized risk management 
to grow these crops. But this does 
not mean that elimination of all the 
risk management subsidies would 
have no impact.
Because the cost of risk is a real 
production cost, risk management 
subsidies are essentially a cost-of-
production subsidy. It follows that 
the main effect of the subsidies is to 
increase the production of the crops 
that receive the subsidized risk man-
agement. The crops and regions that 
have the largest reduction in risk 
will have the largest increase in pro-
duction. High-risk crops and regions 
include dryland cotton in Texas, 
wheat in arid regions of the Great 
Plains, and corn and soybeans in 
parts of the Dakotas and the South-
east. The production of low-risk 
crops in low-risk regions would be 
largely unaffected by elimination of 
risk management subsidies because 
the percentage of reduction in pro-
duction costs would be small.
Why might taxpayers benefi t 
from expanded production of select 
crops in high-risk, largely low-
productive regions? If expanded 
production in high-risk regions is 
large enough to signifi cantly affect 
U.S. and world aggregate produc-
tion, then risk management subsi-
dies will lower market prices for the 
subsidized commodities. Any such 
Continued on page 10
The private sector simply 
cannot compete with 
the heavily subsidized 
risk management 
programs offered by 
the government.
4           CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT                             SPRING 2009
Iowa Ag Review
Bruce A. Babcock
babcock@iastate.edu
515-294-6785
Consumption of biofuels is scheduled to ramp up to 36 billion gallons over the next 
13 years if the timetable set in the 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) is 
to be maintained. To ensure that fuel 
blenders meet this volume, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
uses the market for biofuel RINs 
(Renewable Identifi cation Numbers) 
to create a suffi cient incentive. 
Gasoline producers and import-
ers are assigned a number of RINs 
that they must give to EPA each 
year. Because each gallon of bio-
fuels has a RIN associated with it, 
producers and importers can obtain 
RINs by buying biofuels and keep-
ing the RINs. Alternatively, they can 
enter the RIN market and buy the 
RINs from somebody else. Sellers of 
RINs are companies who purchase 
biofuels but who have no obligation 
to meet an EPA requirement or who 
purchase more biofuels than they 
need to fulfi ll their EPA requirement. 
The market for RINs works because 
the demand for RINs increases when 
the quantity of biofuels purchased 
is insuffi cient to meet the RFS. An 
increased demand for RINs increas-
es the RIN price, which improves 
the relative attractiveness of buying 
biofuels instead of RINs. An example 
shows why.
Suppose that the wholesale 
price of ethanol is $2.00 per gallon 
but the wholesale price of gasoline 
is only $1.50. With these prices, 
the demand for ethanol would be 
quite low. However if with every 
$2.00 gallon of ethanol a buyer 
obtains a RIN with a value of $0.25 
per gallon, then ethanol is more 
attractive because the net cost of 
ethanol would be $1.75 per gallon. 
If the RIN price is $0.75 per gallon, 
then the demand for $2.00 ethanol 
would be quite high because the 
Intricacies of Meeting the Renewable Fuels Standard
net cost of using ethanol to meet 
fuel demand would be only $1.25 
per gallon. The RIN price will even-
tually settle at a level at which the 
demand for ethanol is just great 
enough to meet the RFS. 
Meeting the RFS is more compli-
cated than simply meeting a single 
RIN target, however. Individual 
mandates for conventional biofuels, 
cellulosic biofuels, other advanced 
biofuels, and biodiesel must all be 
met. Although the EPA has not is-
sued fi nal rules about how the RFS 
will be met, it seems plausible that 
there will be at least four separate 
RIN markets at work, one for each 
type of biofuel. 
Determining the Price of RINs
The price of a RIN refl ects the dif-
ference in the market value of a bio-
fuel in meeting fuel demand and the 
price that is needed to allow biofuel 
producers to cover the costs of 
producing the required amount of 
biofuel. This means that RIN prices 
will refl ect changes in both mar-
ket values and production costs. 
Because biofuels substitute for 
petroleum-based fuels, the price of 
crude oil will be one factor that de-
termines RIN prices. Higher crude 
oil prices will lead to lower RIN 
prices. Feedstock costs should re-
main the largest and most variable 
determinant of production costs. 
Thus, high crude oil prices and low 
feedstock prices would seem to cre-
ate a favorable climate for biofuels, 
which would be refl ected in low RIN 
prices. But a key factor in the deter-
mination of future RIN prices is how 
the U.S. market will value biofuels 
once U.S. consumption advances 
beyond about 12 billion gallons, 
which will happen in the next year 
or two. This valuation will depend 
on whether the advanced and cel-
lulosic biofuels mandates are met 
with ethanol or with some other 
biofuel such as biocrude. 
How to Use 35 Billion Gallons 
of Ethanol
Suppose non-diesel automotive fuel 
use in 2022 rises from its current 
level of 135 billion gallons to 150 
billion gallons, of which 35 billion 
gallons comes from ethanol. If some 
small portion of the U.S. gasoline 
supply remains as unblended fuel 
(say 10 percent), then the fuel sup-
ply will consist of 106 billion gallons 
of E10, 15 billion gallons of gasoline, 
and 29 billion gallons of E85. This 
scenario assumes that there are suf-
fi cient fl ex-fuel vehicles in the fl eet to 
use this amount of E85. The prices 
of these fuels must be such that a 
suffi cient number of fl ex-fuel vehicles 
use E85 instead of E10. Because E85 
has about 75 percent of the energy 
value of E10, E85 must have a retail 
price that is at least 25 percent less 
than E10. For comparison, Brazilian 
consumers pay 40% less for 100% 
ethanol relative to E25, a discount 
that is greater than the energy dif-
ference. The extra discount likely is 
needed to compensate drivers for the 
time required to make more frequent 
stops at the gas station. 
Consumers choose fuel based 
on retail prices. Blenders use 
wholesale prices to determine 
. . . a key factor in the 
determination of future RIN 
prices is how the U.S. 
market will value biofuels 
once U.S. consumption 
advances beyond about 
12 billion gallons, which 
will happen in the next 
year or two. 
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Table 1. Wholesale price of 100 percent ethanol needed to induce use 
of E85
Table 2. Wholesale price of ethanol needed to induce use of E15
what fuel blends to use. Retail fuel 
prices equal the wholesale price 
plus taxes plus transportation 
costs plus a profi t margin. Of key 
importance here is the share of the 
spread between retail and whole-
sale prices that are accounted for 
by cents-per-gallon taxes, rather 
than percentage taxes. The federal 
gas tax and most state taxes are 
cents-per-gallon taxes. A reason-
able approximation for the spread 
between wholesale and retail fuel 
prices is that the retail price equals 
the wholesale price plus 10 percent 
plus 40¢. This formula allows for 
calculation of the wholesale price 
of ethanol that would be required 
to make E85 competitive with E10 
at the retail level. Table 1 provides 
the results for crude oil prices 
ranging from $30 to $90 per barrel. 
The prices associated with the 25 
percent discount will occur if con-
sumers choose E85 at a retail price 
that refl ects only the lower fuel 
economy of E85. Even with this op-
timistic assumption, the wholesale 
price of ethanol relative to gaso-
line will be discounted by more 
than its energy content because 
of the cents-per-gallon gas taxes. 
A larger retail discount implies an 
even larger ethanol discount at the 
wholesale level.
These prices hold even if U.S. 
policy is changed to allow E20 
blends. If 10 percent of fuel will be 
pure petroleum gasoline and the 
rest an E20 blend, then a maxi-
mum of 27 billion gallons of etha-
nol could be used in an E20 blend. 
This implies that the remainder 
will need to be sold as E85, and 
the prices in Table 1 remain good 
estimates of the wholesale etha-
nol prices that would be needed to 
induce consumption of 35 billion 
gallons of ethanol.
Inexpensive crude oil in 2022 
implies a wholesale ethanol price 
of between 39¢ and 56¢ per gallon 
(depending on the E85 discount 
needed at retail level) in order to 
make E85 competitive with blended 
fuel. Even if oil rises to $90 per bar-
rel (which implies a retail gaso-
line price of $3.15 per gallon), the 
required wholesale ethanol price 
would fall to between $1.22 and 
$1.57 per gallon. 
These prices are well below the 
levels needed to induce investors to 
spend the billions of dollars need-
ed to meet the cellulosic biofuels 
mandate. These prices are not even 
high enough to induce investors 
to expand corn ethanol capacity 
to the RFS target of 15 billion gal-
lons. However, the price outlook 
for ethanol would be brighter if the 
advanced and cellulosic biofuels 
mandates could be met by biofuels 
other than ethanol.
Alternatives to Ethanol
The economic drawback to us-
ing 35 billion gallons of ethanol 
to meet the RFS is that its lower 
energy content, combined with the 
way that we tax automotive fuels, 
means that the price of ethanol will 
need to be heavily discounted rela-
tive to gasoline to get consumers 
to choose E85. The situation may 
change, however, if 15 billion gal-
lons of ethanol are used to meet the 
conventional biofuels mandate, the 
EPA allows blend levels to rise to 
15 percent (E15), and the advanced 
biofuels mandate is met by biofuels 
other than ethanol. 
If we allocate the 150 billion 
gallons of fuel use to 15 billion gal-
lons of corn ethanol and 20 billion 
gallons of other biofuels, then we 
have 100 billion gallons of E15 and 
20 billion gallons of other biofuels, 
which may be part of the E15 blend 
or blended with the remaining 30 
billion gallons of gasoline. Given the 
lower energy content of ethanol, 
fuel economy from E15 relative to 
gasoline would drop by about 4.8 
percent, or 1.45 miles per gallon on 
a 30-mile-per gallon car. Most likely, 
not many drivers would even notice 
a drop of this magnitude. Table 2 
shows the wholesale ethanol prices 
that would be needed to induce 
drivers to fi ll up with E15 instead 
of petroleum gasoline under three 
different discounts. A zero discount 
implies that drivers would be indif-
ferent between E15 and E0, perhaps 
because of higher octane possibili-
ties with E15. The 2.5 percent dis-
count compensates for a small drop 
in fuel mileage. The 4.8 percent dis-
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count assumes that drivers suffer a 
4.8 percent drop in miles per gallon 
and that they recognize the drop. 
A comparison of the estimates in 
Table 2 of required ethanol prices 
with the estimates in Table 1 shows 
that the worst-case scenario for 
E15 is equal to the best-case sce-
nario for E85: namely, that ethanol 
is priced at its energy value at the 
retail level. For all other scenarios, 
limiting ethanol to 15 billion gal-
lons and moving to other biofuels 
substantially increases the market 
valuation of ethanol. 
RINs versus Direct Subsidies 
Advocates of biofuels should pay 
more attention to the problem of 
closing future gaps between the 
market value of biofuels and the 
price needed to justify the large 
investments that will be required to 
meet the RFS. As previously dis-
cussed, one method of closing the 
gap created by conventional biofuels 
is to move away from ethanol and 
instead meet the advanced biofuels 
mandates with other types of biofu-
els, such as biobutanol or biocrude. 
If the advanced biofuels have higher 
energy content than ethanol (such 
as biobutanol) or can more easily 
be used by the existing vehicle fl eet 
(such as products made from bio-
crude), then there is some hope that 
the market value of advanced biofu-
els could be equal to gasoline.
But a gap between the market 
value of biofuels and the needs of 
investors will likely continue to 
exist because of high feedstock 
prices or low crude oil prices. Cur-
rent methods that are used to close 
the gap include tax credits and the 
market for RINs. At present, the 
RIN price refl ects the difference 
between the ethanol price that is 
required to keep ethanol plants 
running and the market value of the 
ethanol plus the 45¢ tax credit for 
corn ethanol. 
If the RIN market is to be used 
to induce investment in expanded 
capacity, the RIN price would have 
to be high enough to cover both the 
variable costs of producing biofuels 
and the risk-adjusted costs of capi-
tal for new plants as well. The risk 
adjustment is necessary because 
investors know the EPA can waive 
the RFS if the RIN-infl ated cost of 
fuel becomes too high or if existing 
plant capacity or feedstock avail-
ability is inadequate to produce 
enough biofuels to meet the RFS. 
Furthermore, the market for RINs 
seems ill suited for inducing invest-
ment in plant capacity because of 
the time needed for a new plant 
to come online. Will investors risk 
their money today hoping that in 
two or three years the RFS for ad-
vanced biofuels will continue to be 
enforced and the market price of 
RINs will cover their capital costs 
as well as their production costs? 
The risk-adjusted return on capital 
would need to be very high indeed.
Higher tax credits to induce 
investment in expanded capacity 
would be more effective because 
tax credits are paid for by the U.S. 
Treasury rather than by fuel con-
sumers. Thus, they are less likely 
to trigger requests for waivers from 
the RFS. Congress recognized this 
and decided to keep the 45¢-per-
gallon tax credit for corn ethanol 
and to pass a new tax credit of $1.01 
per gallon for cellulosic biofuels. 
The promised ramp-up in the 
production of cellulosic biofuels will 
take more than legislation. It will 
require billions of dollars in private 
investment. It is doubtful that the 
required level of private investment 
will take place without signifi cant 
involvement of the federal govern-
ment. Funding for research, direct 
subsidies in the form of tax credits 
and loan guarantees, and guaran-
tees of adequate fuel prices at the 
plant through enforcement of the 
RFS will all be needed. Supporters of 
biofuels will have to make the case 
that biofuels can increase energy in-
dependence and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions at lower cost than 
other transportation technologies 
such as trains and plug-in hybrids. 
Only then can a strong case be 
made for an expanded federal role in 
the biofuels sector. ◆
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Although farm programs and crop insurance programs are increasingly similar, one 
feature continues to differentiate 
them: crop insurance programs use 
prices that refl ect market condi-
tions at sign-up time, whereas farm 
programs do not. Crop insurance 
programs must use current price 
information to set guarantees to 
keep farmers from moving into or 
out of the program based on wheth-
er revenue guarantees are more 
or less likely to generate a payout. 
Because the government does not 
ask farmers to contribute toward 
meeting the costs of farm programs, 
there is less fi nancial need for the 
programs to refl ect current market 
conditions. But the lack of infl uence 
of current market conditions on the 
prices used to set farm program 
guarantees often means that these 
programs will offer too little or too 
much support to farmers. 
Today’s Safety Net
Currently, the only traditional farm 
program that offers any support to 
corn, soybean, and wheat farmers is 
the direct payment program, be-
cause it does not depend on the level 
of market prices. The countercyclical 
and marketing loan programs offer 
little or no support because mar-
ket prices are expected to stay well 
above the levels that would trigger 
payments. The situation in the late 
1990s and early 2000s was exactly 
the reverse in that the fi xed support 
prices generated large payments to 
farmers and likely caused farmers to 
plant for the government rather than 
the market. 
The new ACRE (Average Crop 
Revenue Election) program uses 
a hybrid approach to setting price 
guarantees by using a two-year 
moving average of past prices. This 
ACRE: Price Support or Crop Insurance?
means that ACRE guarantees will 
refl ect market conditions of the two 
previous years, but not necessarily 
of the current year. 
As farmers fi nalize their 2009 
spring planting decisions, estimated 
ACRE prices for the 2009 crop are 
$4.20/bu for corn, $9.88/bu for soy-
beans, and $6.67/bu for wheat. If 2009 
state yields are close to their past fi ve-
year average, then ACRE payments 
will commence if prices fall 10 per-
cent below these levels. Thus, ACRE 
provides good price protection (at a 
cost equal to 20 percent of a farmer’s 
direct payment) at $3.78/bu, $8.89/
bu, and $6.00/bu for the three crops. 
For corn and soybeans, these protec-
tion points are somewhat below the 
expected market price. For wheat, the 
expected market price is about $5.50 
per bushel, which is below the level of 
the ACRE protection point. 
ACRE Probable Payouts
The graph below shows the range and 
associated probabilities of national 
average per acre payouts by crop if 
all 2009 corn, soybean, and wheat 
acreage is enrolled in ACRE. Large 
payouts will occur if 2009 prices drop 
dramatically or if large-production 
states have low yields. The vertical 
axis shows the probability that aver-
age U.S. ACRE payments per acre will 
be greater than or equal to the indi-
cated level on the horizontal axis. As 
shown, there is a 50 percent chance 
that corn payments will exceed $7 
per acre, a 50 percent chance that 
soybean payments will exceed $9 per 
acre, and a 50 percent chance that 
wheat payments will exceed $12 per 
acre. Given that 20 percent of per acre 
direct payments comes to an amount 
much lower than these payments, the 
chance is much better than 50-50 that 
average ACRE payments will exceed 
the average loss in direct payments. 
This suggests that many corn, soy-
bean, and wheat farmers will fi nd it 
advantageous to enroll in ACRE.
Because ACRE looks to the past 
for prices, and because ACRE guar-
antees can only change by a maxi-
mum of 10 percent in any year, there 
is a chance that 2010 ACRE guaran-
tees will be much greater than what 
producers can expect to get from 
the market for their 2010 crop. This 
will occur if there is a large drop 
in crop prices during the next 10 
months. Under these circumstances, 
farmers could once again use gov-
ernment prices instead of market 
prices for guidance about what to 
plant. This potential weakness of 
ACRE could have been avoided had 
Congress followed the precedent 
of crop insurance, which bases its 
guarantees on futures prices rather 
than historic prices. ◆
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Although uncertainties abound, the outlook for Corn Belt corn and soybean farmers is bright. 
Demand for corn and soybeans re-
mains high despite cutbacks in corn 
exports, feed use, and the fi nancial 
diffi culties of the biofuels indus-
try. World supplies have not grown 
as rapidly as expected because of 
moderating prices, less-than-ideal 
growing-season weather around the 
world, and credit constraints caused 
by the world fi nancial crises. A com-
parison of the situation farmers face 
today with what they faced in April 
2006 before the rapid run-up in com-
modity prices offers some perspec-
tive on how the fortunes of corn and 
soybean farmers have changed over 
the last three years.
Costs and Prices, Then and Now
Table 1 compares April 2006 condi-
tions with current conditions. New 
crop futures prices have increased 
dramatically since 2006, with corn 
prices up 35 percent and soy-
bean prices up 56 percent. These 
higher prices combined with con-
tinued growth in yields mean that 
for a farmer growing 50-50 corn-
soybeans, expected revenue has 
increased 68 percent after account-
ing for average Iowa price basis. 
But, as any Iowa farmer will attest, 
costs have grown as well. Although 
the increases in fertilizer costs have 
garnered the most headlines, seed 
costs have also increased dramati-
cally. It is diffi cult to compare seed 
costs across time because new, 
more productive hybrids and variet-
ies are constantly being released. 
Cost-of-production budgets at Iowa 
State University estimated per acre 
Crop Outlook for 2009
soybean seed costs at $32 in 2005 
and $54 for 2009, which implies a 
14 percent annual increase in seed 
costs. Estimated per acre corn seed 
costs have increased even more, 
from $40 per acre to $93 per acre, 
which implies an average annual in-
crease of more than 20 percent. 
The price of fertilizer soared 
along with all other commodity 
prices in May and June of 2008. Most 
co-ops and other Midwest fertil-
izer dealers were worried about 
obtaining adequate supplies, so 
they booked their 2009 orders early 
to ensure availability. Many Iowa 
farmers have had to pay more than 
$1,000 per ton for DAP (diammo-
nium phosphate), which represents 
a price just below the peak world 
price that occurred last summer. 
Current world prices are around 
$340 per ton. Many Iowa farmers 
are currently applying $900-per-ton 
anhydrous ammonia, which is about 
equal to the peak world price last 
summer. Current world anhydrous 
prices are about $300 per ton. 
The high prices that farmers are 
paying for fertilizer and seed have 
about doubled variable produc-
tion costs for a 50-50 corn-soybean 
farmer, as shown in Table 1. Al-
though it would seem that a dou-
bling of variable production costs 
combined with a 68 percent increase 
in revenue would result in lower net 
returns, Table 1 shows that, in fact, 
returns to land, management, and 
machinery have gone up about $70 
per acre, or by about 43 percent, 
over 2006 levels. Of course, not all 
farmers have seen this increase in 
returns. Land renters have seen land 
rents go up by at least this amount, 
which leaves them in the same posi-
tion as 2006 or worse off.
Table 1 shows that if fertilizer 
prices for the 2010 crop refl ect 
current world prices, and all other 
costs stay at their 2009 levels, then 
expected returns in 2010 should in-
crease by another $70 per acre. The 
idea that Monsanto and Pioneer will 
hold the line on seed prices may not 
be realistic, but of greater impor-
tance to crop farmers’ bottom line 
is whether crop prices can stay at 
their 2009 levels. 
Impact of Biofuels on Corn and 
Soybean Prices
The ethanol industry used a little 
more than 2.1 billion bushels of the 
2006 corn crop. The industry will 
need about 4.3 billion bushels from 
the 2010 crop. This additional corn 
represents about 10 million acres 
after accounting for the additional 
distillers grains that replace corn 
in livestock rations. Another billion 
bushels of corn will be needed from 
Table 1. Costs and returns for Iowa corn and soybeans
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the 2015 crop if mandated levels of 
ethanol are to be met. If the world 
fi nancial crisis is resolved in the 
next year or two, then world de-
mand for livestock feed will again 
resume because both incomes and 
population will continue to grow. 
The combination of growing demand 
from biofuels and from a larger, 
richer world population will out-
strip yield growth over the next fi ve 
years, unless yields grow faster than 
recent trends indicate. This means 
that the United States and the world 
will need to devote more acres to 
feed grain production to meet world 
demand. And the only way to ex-
pand acres is with higher expected 
returns to feed grains.
This rosy scenario relies on 
maintenance of current biofuels pol-
icy. If the ethanol industry severely 
contracts because of a change in 
biofuels or climate policy, then the 
resulting drop in the demand for 
U.S. corn could greatly affect price. 
There seems to be a limit to how se-
vere the contraction could be, how-
ever, because the U.S. fuel industry 
has a robust demand for ethanol as 
a source of octane, and it is the only 
acceptable oxygenate for meeting 
Clean Air Act regulations. The sen-
sitivity of corn and soybean prices 
to a change in biofuels policy can 
be measured by using a model of 
the 2009 corn and soybean markets 
that includes all current policies. 
The model simulates the impacts of 
removing each policy, fi rst individu-
ally and then in tandem.
The model was calibrated to 
USDA’s March 31 prospective plant-
ing report and the April 9 World 
Agricultural Supply and Demand 
Estimates. Market-clearing prices for 
corn, soybeans, ethanol, biodiesel, 
soybean oil, and soybean meal were 
calculated for each of 500 different 
gasoline and diesel prices, export 
demands, and corn and soybean 
production levels. Crude oil prices 
average $63 per barrel across the 
500 draws. The market valuation of 
ethanol is set equal to 67.8 percent 
of wholesale gasoline prices unless 
ethanol supplies drop below 6 bil-
lion gallons, when the demand for 
ethanol becomes much less price 
sensitive. The model results are 
summarized in Table 2.
The fi rst thing to note is that 
corn prices are more sensitive to 
changes in biofuel policies than are 
soybean prices. The reason is that 
corn to ethanol represents a much 
larger proportion of corn demand 
than soybean oil to biodiesel repre-
sents to total soybean demand. If a 
change in biofuel policies results in 
sharply lower corn prices relative 
to soybean prices then in subse-
quent years, corn plantings would 
drop and soybean plantings would 
increase, thereby offsetting some of 
the relative price changes. 
If the tax credit were eliminated, 
corn prices would hardly drop at 
Table 2. Impact of biofuel policies on average 2009 prices
all. This reveals that in most of the 
scenarios examined, the ethanol 
mandate is binding so that a drop in 
the tax credit would simply increase 
the RIN (Renewable Identifi cation 
Number) price. This can be seen by 
the $0.32-per-gallon increase in the 
average ethanol RIN price. If the Re-
newable Fuels Standard (RFS) were 
waived, then corn prices would drop 
by $0.50 per bushel (11 percent). 
Elimination of the import tariff 
would reduce domestic ethanol pro-
duction by about 900 million gallons 
per year. Imports would increase 
by an average of one billion gal-
lons. The substitution of imported 
ethanol for domestically produced 
ethanol in subsequent market-
ing years would be larger because 
Brazil would eventually increase 
its export capacity. Removal of all 
incentives would reduce corn prices 
by about 20 percent. The estimated 
drop would be even larger, but end-
ing stocks increase by an average 
of more than 800 million bushels. If 
the elimination of biofuel policies 
were permanent, then it is unlikely 
that stocks would grow by such an 
amount, and market prices would 
drop by an even greater amount.
An Outlook Linked to Energy Policy
The results in Table 2 clearly indi-
cate that strong crop prices depend 
on a continuation of biofuel policies. 
If crude oil prices stay at projected 
levels, then maintenance of the RFS 
has the greatest impact on keeping 
crop prices high. Removal of the im-
port tariff would have modest price 
impacts at fi rst, but over time an 
increasing share of the RFS would 
be met by imported sugarcane etha-
nol. That the outlook for Corn Belt 
farmers depends on maintenance 
of a large biofuels sector should not 
be surprising. After all, the earliest, 
strongest, and most consistent sup-
porters of biofuel policies have been 
farm groups. ◆
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Should Government Subsidize 
Farmers’ Risk Management?
Continued from page 3
decrease in commodity prices will 
benefi t consumers somewhat. 
But the prospect of slightly low-
er commodity prices cannot justify 
the billions of annual risk manage-
ment subsidies. Furthermore, a large 
proportion of the subsidies do not 
even fl ow to farmers but rather go to 
the crop insurance industry. Instead 
of looking at taxpayer benefi ts of 
expanded production in high-risk ar-
eas, it is more instructive to look at 
the political benefi ts of this expand-
ed production, and at the lobbies 
that guard against changes in risk 
management policy.
Political Benefi ts of Subsidizing 
Farmers’ Management of Risk
Members of Congress who represent 
high-risk, low-productive agricultural 
areas of the United States are among 
the biggest supporters of traditional 
farm subsidies, crop insurance, and 
disaster payments. This support is 
entirely consistent with a desire to 
serve their constituents’ interests in 
maintaining agricultural production 
and the associated support infra-
structure. Given the prominent role 
that agriculture plays in many Great 
Plains states, it is not surprising that 
suffi cient support for continuing sub-
sidies is so easily obtained.
What is not so easy to under-
stand is why we choose to fund a 
vast network of insurance agents 
to induce farmers to buy heavily 
subsidized crop insurance, and why 
we need to pay private insurance 
companies large amounts of money 
to service the insurance contracts. 
Regional political interest in sup-
porting agriculture in high-risk ar-
eas could be accomplished at much 
lower expense by eliminating pro-
gram duplication through program 
consolidation, and by administering 
all programs through the FSA (as 
we are doing with SURE, ACRE, LDP, 
CCP, and DP). This would save on 
aggregate program expenditures, 
and it would save the large fees cur-
rently paid to crop insurance agents 
and companies. 
One straightforward explanation 
for why attempts at such a consoli-
dation were not successful in the 
2008 farm bill is that crop insurance 
agents and companies have their 
own supporters in Congress. To-
gether, supporters of crop insurance 
agents, crop insurance companies, 
and of agriculture in higher-risk re-
gions make a formidable barrier to 
agricultural reform. 
Different lobbying groups often 
need to support each other’s priori-
ties in order to keep the political 
coalition together. Thus, we see that 
the new FSA-administered SURE di-
saster program, which was a prior-
ity of senators from Montana and 
North Dakota, requires that farmers 
buy crop insurance, which automat-
ically increases compensation to 
that industry.
It is possible that reform will 
come about simply through public 
awareness of the excesses of the 
risk management subsidies. But 
if history is any guide, it will take 
something more. Perhaps the need 
to fi nance trillion-dollar defi cits as 
well as federal programs that pro-
vide benefi ts like clean air and wa-
ter, transportation infrastructure, 
and nutrition will eventually force 
Congress to economize by increas-
ing the effi ciency of risk manage-
ment programs in agriculture. ◆
. . . the prospect of 
slightly lower commodity 
prices cannot justify 
the billions of annual risk 
management subsidies. 
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